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Abstract—A framework for stealth communication with van-
ishing power (VP) is presented by studying binary symmetric
channels. Coding theorems are proved by modifying Gallager’s
error exponents for VP and by applying resolvability exponents.
The analysis unifies and generalizes existing rate bounds for
covert and stealth communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Covert communication [1] refers to a scenario where a
sender Alice communicates with a receiver Bob without a third
party, Warren, being able to detect the communication. In con-
trast to the secrecy problem, it is not the content of the message
that Alice and Bob want to hide from Warren but the presence
of the message itself. Bash et al. [1] showed that on the order
of
√
n bits can be covertly communicated in n channel uses
over additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels. This
square root law also applies to discrete memoryless channels
(DMCs) [2], [3].
Covertness can be measured by the informational diver-
gence of two types of channel output statistics: those when
a meaningful message is transmitted and those when a se-
quence of “zero” symbols is transmitted, where the “zero”
symbol usually represents the absence of energy. Second-order
asymptotics for various covertness measures are derived in
[4]. Covert communication may require shared randomness
between Alice and Bob in the form of a secret key, unless
Warren’s channel from Alice is noisier than Bob’s, as shown
in [5], [6] for binary symmetric channels (BSCs).
Stealth communication generalizes covert communication
by discarding the requirement that Alice must be silent when
not communicating information to Bob, i.e., Alice is free to
transmit symbols other than the “zero” symbol. The idea is
that Alice confuses Warren by sending obfuscating symbols.
Obfuscation is an old technique to enhance privacy, e.g., it
can hide personal information such as mobility patterns or
web browsing behavior.
One can show formally [7], [8] that obfuscation can break
the square root law, and in fact communication with positive
rate is possible without Warren being able to detect meaningful
communication. The price that Alice pays is that she must
consume more energy than for covert communication, and we
thus arrive at a capacity-cost tradeoff. This tradeoff depends on
which obfuscation patterns are permitted, and we will consider
obfuscation strings consisting of independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) channel symbols.
The main contribution of this work is two-fold.
1) We introduce a framework for stealth communication
that includes previously treated scenarios as special
cases. In particular, we are interested in using vanishing
power, as for covert communication, but with energy that
scales as nα, 0 ≤ α < 1, with blocklength n. Observe
that covert communication has α ≤ 1/2 while stealth
communication as treated in [7], [8] has α = 1.
2) We prove coding theorems by using suitably modi-
fied Gallager exponents. This gives an alternative, and
we believe simpler, approach to prove and understand
achievability as compared to previous work.
This paper is organized as follows. Sec. II introduces
notation and classic error exponents. In Sec. III, we derive
achievable codebook scaling constants for vanishing power
(VP) communication by using modified error exponents. We
apply these results in Sec. IV to prove achievability of VP
stealth communication. Finally, we compare our results for
the covert communication case with bounds from [2], [3], [6]
in Sec. V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
Random variables are denoted by upper case letters and their
realizations by the corresponding lower case letters. Finite
sequences of random variables are written with a superscript
indicating the number of symbols of the sequence, e.g.,
Xn = X1, . . . , Xn. Let X be a discrete random variable with
probability distribution PX and alphabet X . If the symbolsXi,
i = 1, . . . , n, are i.i.d. according to PX , then the distribution
of Xn is PXn(x
n) =
∏n
i=1 PX(xi) , P
n
X(x
n). For any two
probability distributions PX and PX˜ on X where PX ≪ PX˜ ,
i.e. PX˜(x) = 0 ⇒ PX(x) = 0 for any x ∈ X , the
informational divergence between PX and PX˜ is
D(PX‖PX˜) ,
∑
x:PX(x)>0
PX(x) log
PX(x)
PX˜(x)
(1)
and their variational distance is defined as
V(PX‖PX˜) ,
1
2
∑
x∈X
|PX(x) − PX˜(x)| . (2)
Informational divergence and variational distance are related
by Pinsker’s inequality:
V(PX‖PX˜)2 ≤
1
2
D(PX‖PX˜) . (3)
The chi-squared distance of PX and PX˜ is
χ2(PX‖PX˜) ,
∑
x∈X
(PX(x)− PX˜(x))2
PX˜(x)
. (4)
The mutual information of X and Y is denoted I(PX ;PY |X).
B. Error Exponents
Let W be Alice’s message and let Wˆ be Bob’s estimate
of this message. Gallager used a random coding argument
to show that if each message W selects a codeword from a
code of cardinality M and length n, then the worst-case error
probability under maximum-likelihood (ML) decoding over a
noisy channel PY n |Xn can be bounded as [9, Ch. 5]
Pr
[
Wˆ 6= 1|W = 1
]
≤ (M − 1)ρ
∑
yn
{∑
xn
PXn(x
n)PY n |Xn(yn |xn)
1
1+ρ
}1+ρ
(5)
where ρ, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, is an optimization parameter.
Consider a discrete memoryless source (DMS) with proba-
bility distribution PX and a DMC PY |X . Define the code rate
as R = logM
n
. We have (M − 1)ρ ≤ Mρ = enRρ and (5)
becomes (see [9])
Pr
[
Wˆ 6= 1 |W = 1
]
≤ 2−nEG(R,PX ) (6)
where the error exponent EG(R,PX) is defined as
EG(R,PX) = max
0≤ρ≤1
[E0(ρ, PX)− ρR] (7)
E0(ρ, PX) = − log
∑
y
{∑
x
PX(x)PY |X(y|x)
1
1+ρ
}1+ρ
.
(8)
III. ERROR EXPONENTS FOR VP COMMUNICATION
This section considers classic point-to-point communication
over a BSC and with VP. Let BSC(p) denote a BSC with
cross-over probability p. We define the energy of the binary
sequence Xn as its Hamming weight
∑n
i=1X
2
i . In the fol-
lowing, the code length n is a free parameter and we transmit
only one codeword (one-shot analysis).
A. Information Rate Analysis
Suppose we have the average block power constraint
1
n
E
[
n∑
i=1
X2i
]
≤ an
α
n
(9)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and 0 < a. The constraint can
be satisfied by choosing the channel input distribution as
PX,n(1) = 1−PX,n(0) = anαn . Note that the distribution PX,n
directly depends on the choice of the blocklength n, which we
emphasize with the additional subscript. Clearly, if 0 ≤ α < 1
then the power of Xn will vanish for n → ∞. We therefore
refer to signaling with 0 ≤ α < 1 as VP transmission.
We assess how much information can be transmitted with
VP over a BSC(p). Let the transmitted signal Xn be dis-
tributed according to PX,n. The receiver observes the binary
sequence Y n which is distributed as
PY,n(0) =
(
1− an
α
n
)
p¯+
anα
n
p
= p¯− (1− 2p) · an
α
n
(10)
PY,n(1) =
(
1− an
α
n
)
p+
anα
n
p¯
= p+ (1− 2p) · an
α
n
(11)
where we introduced the shorthand p¯ = 1 − p. The mutual
information is
I(PX,n;PY |X) = H(PY,n)−H2(p)
= H2
(
p+ (1− 2p) · an
α
n
)
−H2(p)
≈ (1− 2p)an
α
n
· log p¯
p
(12)
where H2(p) = −p log p − (1 − p) log(1 − p) and where we
have used the first-order Taylor expansion
H2(x)|x=p ≈ H2(p) + (x − p) · ∂H2(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=p
. (13)
B. Modified Random Coding Exponent
Directly applying the error exponent framework introduced
in Sec. II-B to our model has E0(ρ, PX,n) scaling with n
α/n
which goes to zero as n increases. To get a more meaningful
exponent, we normalize (8) by the scaling factor nα/n and
compute
Eˆα0 (ρ, PX,n) = lim
n→∞
n
nα
E0(ρ, PX,n) . (14)
Now define Rα =
1
nα
logM and a modified error exponent
EˆαG(Rα, PX,n) = max
0≤ρ≤1
(
Eˆα0 (ρ, PX,n)− ρRα
)
(15)
to describe the error probability decay with nα as
Pr
[
Wˆ 6= 1 |W = 1
]
≤ 2−nαEˆαG(Rα,PX,n) (16)
for large n.
In the following we show that the modified error exponents
exhibit similar properties as the well-studied Gallager expo-
nents reviewed in Sec. II-B. For the BSC channel model with
input PX,n as defined in Sec. III-A, the expression (14) can
be explicitly derived:
Eˆα0 (ρ, PX,n) = lim
n→∞
n
nα
[
− log
(((
1− anα
n
)
p¯
1
1+ρ + an
α
n
p
1
1+ρ
)1+ρ
+
((
1− anα
n
)
p
1
1+ρ + an
α
n
p¯
1
1+ρ
)1+ρ)]
(17)
=
{
(1 + ρ)a
(
p¯
1
1+ρ − p 11+ρ
)(
p¯
ρ
1+ρ − p ρ1+ρ
)
, α < 1
E0(ρ, PX,n), α = 1 .
(18)
The complete derivation of (18) involves L’Hospital’s rule
and is omitted due to space limitations. For the extremal values
of ρ, we have for 0 ≤ α < 1:
lim
ρ→1
Eˆα0 (ρ, PX,n) = 2a(
√
p¯−√p)2 (19)
lim
ρ→0
Eˆα0 (ρ, PX,n) = 0 . (20)
Finally, the maximum scaling constant Rα for which the
modified error exponent (15) is positive, and therefore the error
probability vanishes for large n, is given by
Rα,max(PX,n) =
∂Eˆα0 (ρ, PX,n)
∂ρ
∣∣∣∣∣
ρ=0
= a
{(
p¯
1
1+ρ − p 11+ρ
)(
p¯
ρ
1+ρ − p ρ1+ρ
)
+
1
1 + ρ
·[(
p¯
1
1+ρ − p 11+ρ
)(
p¯
ρ
1+ρ · log p¯− p ρ1+ρ · log p
)
−
(
p¯
1
1+ρ · log p¯− p 11+ρ · log p
)(
p¯
ρ
1+ρ − p ρ1+ρ
)]}
ρ=0
= a(1− 2p) log p¯
p
. (21)
Observe that the right-hand side (RHS) of (21) is the same
as the RHS of (12) after normalizing by nα/n. The error
probability thus decays exponentially with nα if
nαRα / nI(PX,n;PY |X) (22)
which for α = 1 reduces to R < I(PX ;PY |X).
IV. STEALTH COMMUNICATION WITH VP OBFUSCATION
Consider now the stealth communication problem depicted
in Fig. 1. Alice wants to transmit a message reliably to Bob
over the memoryless channel PY |X without being detected by
Warren. Warren observes the output of the channel PZ |X and
makes a binary hypothesis test whether Alice has transmitted
information or obfuscation symbols. Suppose the channel
PY |X from Alice to Bob is a BSC(p), and the channel PZ |X
from Alice to Warren is a BSC(q). We do not restrict the values
of p and q other than p ≤ 1/2 and q ≤ 1/2. Suppose that Alice
sends with VP as in (9) when transmitting information, and
that she sends i.i.d. sequences Xn with VP given by
1
n
E
[
n∑
i=1
X2i
]
=
bnβ
n
, 0 ≤ β < 1, 0 < b . (23)
when transmitting obfuscation symbols. In the following, we
derive conditions on a, α, b, β to achieve stealth communica-
tion for both uncoded and coded transmission.
A. Uncoded Stealth
Let PX,n and PXo,n denote the marginals of input distribu-
tions satisfying (9) and (23), respectively. Let PZ,n and PZo,n
be the corresponding marginals of the distributions PZn and
PnZo , respectively, which Warren observes at the output of his
BSC(q) from Alice. To prevent Warren from detecting the
communication with Bob, Alice must ensure that
D(PZn‖PnZo) ≤ δ (24)
Alice P
n
Y |X
Xn
Bob
Y n
PnZ|X Warren
Zn
Fig. 1. Stealth communication problem.
for a small constant δ > 0.
Following [2], we first consider an uncoded stealth scenario,
where Zn is i.i.d., i.e., PZn = P
n
Z . The stealth constraint (24)
is then
nD(PZ,n‖PZo,n) ≤ δ . (25)
Let µn =
[
anα
n
bnβ
n
]T
. We write D(PZ,n‖PZo,n) as a
function of µn and use
D(PZ,n‖PZo,n) =
1
2
(q¯ − q)2
qq¯
(
anα
n
− bn
β
n
)2
+ o(‖µn‖2).
(26)
To prove (26), note that the second-order Taylor approximation
for a scalar function g : Xn → R around a point x0 is
g(x) = g(x0) + ∇g(x)T
∣∣
x=x0
(x− x0)
+
1
2
(x− x0)T ∇2g(x)
∣∣
x=x0
(x− x0) + o(‖x− x0‖2)
(27)
where∇g and∇2g denote the gradient and the Hessian matrix
of g, respectively. We further have
D(PZ,n‖PZo,n)|µn=0 = 0 (28)
∇D(PZ,n‖PZo,n)|µn=0 = 0 (29)
∇2D(PZ,n‖PZo,n)
∣∣
µn=0
=
[
(q¯−q)2
qq¯
− (q¯−q)2
qq¯
− (q¯−q)2
qq¯
(q¯−q)2
qq¯
]
. (30)
Inserting (28)–(30) into (27) gives (26).
From (26), the bound (25) is fulfilled for sufficiently large
n if∣∣anα − bnβ∣∣ ≤ k√n with k = √2qq¯
q¯ − q
√
δ. (31)
Alice can thus determine achievable values of (a, α) if Warren
expects her to send with total transmit energy bnβ . Alter-
natively, Alice can determine how much energy to invest
for obfuscation to keep Warren confused when she transmits
information.
A trivial but intuitive choice is anα = bnβ . In this case,
PZ,n = PZo,n and D(PZ,n‖PZo,n) = 0. Moreover, if β > 12
(or α > 12 ), this is the only choice for which (31) holds for all
n. If we consider a fixed number of channel uses n, however,
we can choose any values of anα and bnβ satisfying (31).
For large n, the left-hand side (LHS) of (31) is dominated
by the maximum exponent max(α, β). If β ≤ 12 , Alice could
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
β
α
D(PZ,n‖PZo,n) = 0 possible
⇔
∣
∣
∣an
α − bnβ
∣
∣
∣ = 0
nD(PZ,n‖PZo,n) ≤ δ possible
⇔
∣
∣
∣an
α − bnβ
∣
∣
∣ ≤ k√n
Fig. 2. Information exponent α vs. obfuscation exponent β.
choose α = 12 and still satisfy the stealth constraint (31).
Fig. 2 summarizes the achievable information exponents α as
a function of the obfuscation exponent β.
Consider now the covert communication scenario where
bnβ
n
= 0. The LHS of (31) simplifies to
anα ≤ k√n (32)
and allows Alice to set α = 12 and a = k for any n. We
recover the square root law for covert communication with
maximum codebook scaling constant (see (21))
R 1
2
,max = k(1− 2p) log
p¯
p
=
√
2qq¯ · (1− 2p)
1− 2q
√
δ log
p¯
p
. (33)
Fig. 2 might give the impression that if one can transmit
with α = 12 even if
bnβ
n
= 0, then spending energy on
obfuscation does not help in transmitting more information
unless β > 0.5. However, consider the case β = 12 . As before,
Alice can choose the information exponent also to be α = 12 .
The LHS of (31) now reduces to |a− b| ≤ k. This allows
Alice to choose
a = k + b (34)
which translates into an increased maximum square root
scaling constant R 1
2
,max compared with (33).
B. Coded Stealth
Consider the following random coding experiment. Alice
generates MK codewords Xn(w, v), w = 1, . . . ,M , v =
1, . . . ,K , where the codeword symbols are choosen i.i.d.
according to PX,n. Let C˜ = {Xn(1, 1), . . . , Xn(M,K)} be
the random codebook and let all codewords be equiprobable.
Further, Alice and Bob share a secret key v˜ drawn uniformly
from {1, . . . ,K}. Let C˜v˜ = {Xn(1, v˜), . . . , Xn(M, v˜)} be the
corresponding subcodebook.
Alice: Given a message w and the key v˜, Alice transmits
the codeword xn(w, v˜) from the subcodebook C˜v˜.
Bob: Bob observes the output yn of his BSC(p) from Alice.
As he knows that Alice used the subcodebook C˜v˜, he finds his
ML estimate as
wˆ = argmax
w′∈{1,...,M}
PY n |Xn(yn |xn(w′, v˜)) . (35)
Warren: Warren observes the output zn of his BSC(q). To
detect whether Alice was transmitting information to Bob or
not, he runs a binary hypothesis test. As he does not know the
secret key v˜, he must test against the entire codebook C˜.
Reliability: Both Alice and Bob know that subcodebook C˜v˜
was used. As the nM symbols of C˜v˜ are sampled from PX,n,
we can apply the modified error exponents from Sec. III-B.
According to (21), the probability of decoding error can be
made small as long as
Rα < a(1− 2p) log p¯
p
. (36)
Stealth: Warren observes Zn with the distribution
PZn |C˜(z
n |C˜) =
MK∑
w=1
1
MK
PnZ |X(z
n |Xn(w, v)) . (37)
To keep Warren confused, Alice must therefore ensure that
E
[
D(PZn |C˜‖PnZo)
]
≤ θ (38)
for a small constant θ > 0.
Let RMKα = (logM+logK)/n
α be the scaling constant of
the code C˜. The stealth constraint (38) is satisfied by choosing
RMKα > a(1− 2q) log
q¯
q
(39)
where a satisfies the uncoded stealth constraint (31) for an
appropriately small constant δ > 0.
Proof: We split E
[
D(PZn |C˜‖PnZo)
]
into three parts:
E
[
D(PZn |C˜‖PnZo)
]
= E
[
D(PZn |C˜‖PnZ )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
+D(PnZ‖PnZo)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
+ E
[(∑
zn
PZn |C˜(z
n |C˜)− PnZ (zn)
)
log
PnZ (z
n)
PnZo(z
n)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(c)
. (40)
Bounding (a) is a standard resolvability problem [10], [3]. We
follow the proof technique from [11, Lemma 2], [12, Sec. III-
B], [13, Sec. 5.2.2, Lemma 5.3] that develops resolvability
exponents, and we adapt it to our VP transmission setting.
Consider − 12 ≤ ρ ≤ 0. Since the modified error exponent Eˆα0
as in (14) and (18) becomes negative for these values of ρ,
we define the modified resolvability exponents as
Eˆαr (ρ, PX,n) = −Eˆα0 (ρ, PX,n) (41)
EˆαR(Rα, PX,n) = inf− 1
2
≤ρ≤0
(
Eˆα0 (ρ, PX,n) + ρR
MK
α
)
. (42)
The analysis in Sec. II-B also holds for (41) and (42), and we
obtain{
EˆαR(R
MK
α , PX,n) < 0 if R
MK
α > a(1− 2q) log q¯q
EˆαR(R
MK
α , PX,n) = 0 if R
MK
α ≤ a(1− 2q) log q¯q .
(43)
Next, following [11, Sec. III], the average divergence
E
[
D(PZn |C˜‖PnZ )
]
is the mutual information I(C˜;Zn) of the
codebook C˜ and the channel output Zn. We therefore define
Eˆα,nr (ρ, PXn) = log
∑
zn
{
E
[
PZn |C˜(z
n |C˜)
] 1
1+ρ
}1+ρ
(44)
which has the following properties [11, Lemma 2]:
Eˆα,nr (0, PXn) = Eˆ
α
r (0, PX,n) = 0 (45)
∂Eˆα,nr (ρ, PX,n)
∂ρ
∣∣∣∣∣
ρ=0
= −E
[
D(PZn |C˜‖PnZ )
]
(46)
∂2Eˆα,nr (ρ, PX,n)
∂ρ2
∣∣∣∣∣
ρ=0
≥ 0 . (47)
A slight modification of the proof of [12, Lemma 2], [13,
Lemma 5.3] where we replace the codebook size by log |C˜| =
nαRMKα in [12, Eq. (46)] yields
Eˆα,nr (0, PXn) ≤ log
(
1 + en
αEˆαR(R
MK
α ,PX,n)
)
≤ enαEˆαR(RMKα ,PX,n). (48)
By combining (45)–(47), we obtain
ρ ·
(
−E
[
D(PZn |C˜‖PnZ )
])
≤ Eˆα,nr (ρ, PXn) (49)
for − 12 ≤ ρ ≤ 0, and thus
E
[
D(PZn |C˜‖PnZ )
]
≤ Eˆ
α,n
r (0, PXn)
−ρ
≤ e
nαEˆαR(R
MK
α ,PX,n)
−ρ (50)
where we used (48) in the last step. By (50) and (43), we
see that the term (a) in (40) goes to zero for n → ∞ if
RMKα > a(1− 2q) log q¯q .
To bound the term (b) in (40) we note that D(PnZ‖PnZo) =
nD(PZ,n‖PZo,n). We can therefore reuse our results for
uncoded stealth and must only ensure that we satisfy (31) for
a small enough constant δ, 0 < δ < θ.
Finally, we rewrite term (c) in (40) as follows:∣∣∣∣∣E
[(∑
zn
PZn |C˜(z
n |C˜)− PnZ (zn)
)
log
PnZ (z
n)
PnZo(z
n)
]∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 2nE
[
V(PZn |C˜‖PnZ )
]
log
1
νd
(51)
≤ 2n
√
1
2
E
[
D(PZn |C˜‖PnZ )
]
log
1
νd
(52)
≤
√
2n · e
1
2
nαEˆαR(R
MK
α ,PX,n)√−ρ log
1
νd
(53)
where we used (2) and νd = minz PZo,n(z) in (51), where (52)
follows by Pinsker’s inequality (3) and Jensen’s inequality, and
where we reused the bound (50) in (53). Again, the RHS of
(53) goes to zero as n→∞ if RMKα > a(1− 2q) log q¯q .
Summarizing (36) and (39), for small positive ξ we can
bound
logM ≤ 1
nα
(1 − ξ)a(1− 2p) log p¯
p
(54)
logK ≥
1
nα
[
(1 + ξ)a(1 − 2q) log q¯
q
− (1− ξ)a(1 − 2p) log p¯
p
]+
(55)
where [x]+ = max(x, 0) and where α, a satisfy (31) for
specified β, b.
V. DISCUSSION
We compare our results to bounds derived in [2], [3],
[6]. The work in [2] considers covert communication where
Warren and Bob both observe channel outputs from a BSC(q).
Moreover, the channel outputs are i.i.d. also when Alice
transmits information to Bob, which is equivalent to our
uncoded stealth scenario from Sec. IV-A with α = 12 and
bnβ
n
= 0. The maximum scaling constant (33) reduces to
R 1
2
,max =
√
2qq¯
√
δ log q¯
q
, which is the same value one would
obtain from [2, Thm. 2] for BSCs.
Similarly, we compare our coded results (54) and (55) to
the bounds in Corollary 2 of Thm. 2 in [3] for the covert
communication scenario. From (31) we know that Alice can
choose at most α = 12 and a = k. Further, k can be
alternatively expressed as
k =
√
2
χ2(PZ |X(·|1)‖PZ |X(·|0))
·
√
δ (56)
where δ < E
[
D(PZn |C˜‖PnZo)
]
. Our bounds then match the
ones from [3, Corollary 2] when evaluated for BSCs.
Our results also apply to covert communication without a
secret key by choosing logK = 0. The codebook scaling
constant Rα is then upper and lower bounded by the RHSs of
(36) and (39), respectively. These are exactly the same bounds
reported in [6, Thm. 1] for BSCs and variational distance as the
stealth measure, where the authors assumed that Bob’s channel
from Alice must be better than Warren’s. Note that without
a secret key, one must have p < q to satisfy the bounds.
Moreover, (55) implies that the key size can be zero if p < q.
We conclude with two remarks. First, due to space con-
straints we presented only the achievability proof and left the
converse proof for a future document. Second, we have studied
BSCs only; extensions to general DMCs will be treated in a
future document.
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